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The role of ideas in EU responses to international crises: 
Comparing the cases of Iraq and Iran 
 
Benjamin Kienzle 
 
 
Abstract 
This article examines how cognitive and normative ideas influence the ability of the 
European Union (EU) to formulate common policies in response to international crises 
such as the 2002/2003 Iraq crisis and the Iranian nuclear crisis (since 2002). It argues 
that in crisis situations, i.e. in highly uncertain circumstances, ideas become often the 
principal guide for policy-makers. More specifically, ideas foster interpretations of a 
crisis along several core themes, above all, how the crisis issue is perceived, which 
means are deemed to be legitimate and/or effective and, depending on the particular 
crisis, how other relevant themes are seen, e.g. the appropriate relation with the United 
States. Thus, the formulation of common EU crisis responses depends on the 
convergence of these interpretations in member states – as in the Iran crisis. On the 
contrary, if member states’ interpretations diverge beyond a common “ideational space” 
– as in the case of Iraq – dissonance will be the probable outcome. 
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Introduction 
Research on ideational factors in the social sciences has become increasingly influential 
(Béland and Cox, 2011), especially on cognitive and normative ideas, i.e. ideas that 
respectively ‘elucidate “what is and what to do”’ and that ‘indicate “what is good or bad 
about what is” in light of “what one ought to do”’ (Schmidt, 2008: 306).1 The European 
Union (EU) has been at the centre stage of ideational research early on, most notably in 
integration studies (Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998; Parsons, 2002) and in economic and 
monetary policy (Jabko, 2006; McNamara, 1999; Quaglia, 2004). However, apart from 
a few exceptions (Croft, 2000; Howorth, 2004), the controversial topic of EU foreign 
policy cooperation has received little attention, even though various analyses have 
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shown the added value of idea based research in foreign and security policies (Goldstein 
and Keohane, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996). It is, therefore, in need of further research (see 
Bickerton et al., 2011: 10). 
Most research using ideas as variables focuses on nation states, even in studies of the 
European Union. The explanation of cooperation between states as in the case of the 
European Union is usually left to one specific function of ideas, namely to ‘focal points’ 
(Garrett and Weingast, 1993) or related concepts used in ‘strategic constructivism’ 
(Jabko, 2006) that highlight the unifying capacity of certain key ideas. However, in the 
concrete case of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) such unifying 
ideas exist only, if at all, as relatively weak concepts, e.g. effective multilateralism. 
Nevertheless, ideas may still have explanatory power regarding EU cooperation – or its 
failure – in international affairs. Both idea based research in the economic realm 
(McNamara, 1999; Quaglia, 2004) and reflexive approaches to norms (Puetter and 
Wiener, 2007) suggest that cognitive and normative ideas – or the concrete meaning of 
certain ideas or norms – in member states influence the (in) ability to establish common 
policies at the level of the EU. The key issue is how in a given situation ideas in 
individual EU member states play out in the CFSP. 
More specifically, it will be argued that cognitive and normative ideas in member states 
may foster either converging or diverging interpretations of specific international 
circumstances in terms of issue at stake, instrumentality, i.e. ‘... the instruments or 
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means that states find available and appropriate’ (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 463), and in 
terms of other factors such as transatlantic relations, thus either facilitating or impeding 
common EU policies. The crucial question that this article will deal with is, in 
particular, if these interpretations converge so much at the level of the EU that they fall 
within the limits of a common ideational space separating possible and impossible 
agreement on common policies in international crises – thus, bringing about consensus 
– or if they diverge beyond the limits of this space, leading to dissonance. In this way, 
the article contributes to what has been recently identified as one of the key research 
challenges in European foreign and security policy: ‘why is it that European cooperation 
in foreign, security, and defense policy (...) seems to work and hold together in some 
specific instances yet not in others?’ (Krotz and Maher, 2011: 549). 
Admittedly, in an essentially intergovernmental policy area as the CFSP, where all 
member states are de facto veto players, ideas may not be the only variables that can 
explain the (in) ability of the EU to act collectively in international affairs. However, the 
existing idea based research suggests that at least in circumstances of high uncertainty 
where no clear pre-given interests exist, ideas can make a significant difference, as they 
help decision-makers to make sense of a given situation (McNamara, 1999; Howorth, 
2004). It is, thus, in these circumstances where ideas may have a decisive impact on the 
EU’s ability to formulate a common response or not. The high uncertainty of 
international crises, not least in the field of security, turns crisis situations into 
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particularly suitable case studies to explore the role of ideas (see Bratberg, 2011). In the 
field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) two crises have 
occurred that are potentially very illustrative, as they led in one instance to failed and, in 
the other case, to substantial (though not necessarily successful) European foreign 
policy output: the 2003 Iraq war and its prelude (Menon, 2004; Puetter and Wiener, 
2007) and the Iranian nuclear crisis after 2002 (Dryburgh, 2008; Sauer, 2008; Harnisch, 
2007). 
The article begins with an outline of the framework that conceptualises the role of ideas 
in either facilitating or impeding EU policies in international crises. After a brief 
justification of the case study selection, I will proceed examining empirically how 
cognitive and normative ideas led to diverging or converging interpretations of the Iraq 
and Iran crises and, thus, to either dissonance or consensus in the EU. Following other 
studies on European foreign and security policy (Mérand et al., 2011; Wagnsson, 2010), 
the main focus will be on the dominant interpretations in the key member states – 
Britain, France and Germany – as within the constraints of this article it is not possible 
to examine in detail all the idiosyncratic processes that led to certain interpretations in 
all member states. Finally, I will outline what this analysis reveals about the ideational 
space mentioned above and link it to the broader research on European foreign and 
security policies. 
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Conceptual framework 
Generally, the EU deals with international problems such as the Iraqi and Iranian crises 
in the context of the CFSP, formerly the EU’s so-called second pillar. Institutionally, 
this means that basically all decisions have to be taken by consensus or collective 
agreement, i.e. the set-up of the CFSP remains essentially intergovernmental (Wagner, 
2003). Consequently, some analysts are quite sceptical about the capability of the EU to 
act independently of the interests of its member states in international affairs 
(Hoffmann, 2000). However, the institutionalization and socialization literature has 
shown that the clash of ‘national interests’ of member states is not the norm in the 
CFSP. On the contrary, during the last 40 years the EU has established numerous 
institutions, legal rules, norms and habits such as the well-known coordination reflex 
that facilitate increased cooperation among member states (Smith, 2004). An emerging 
body of literature on Brussels based bureaucracies and institutions has even highlighted 
the increasingly prominent role of supranational elements in EU decision-making in 
foreign and security policy (Cross, 2007; Vanhoonacker et al., 2010). This article does 
not go so far as to concede supranational elements a dominant role in international 
crises, in particular if they are highly politicised and mediatised (see Vanhoonacker et 
al., 2010: 23). In line with recent findings from the network literature on the EU, it 
assumes that ‘... a handful of traditional state actors retain strategic positions vis-a-vis 
weaker supranational and non-state actors’ (Mérand et al., 2011: 122). At the same time, 
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however, it maintains that these state actors do not necessarily represent pre-given, 
stable ‘national interests’ of member states in Brussels during international crises. That 
is, EU action or inaction is not necessarily the result of negotiated compromises 
between ‘national interests’. 
Arguably, pre-given interests do not play a dominant role in international crises, as they 
usually confront policy-makers with novel circumstances, where it is not clear what the 
issue is, how it can be dealt with and how to interpret intervening factors such as 
important third countries. That is, one of the key characteristics of international crises is 
their uncertainty, often aggravated by the lack of reliable information. As long as no 
obvious economic or strategic interests have been established before, e.g. in the form of 
vital economic relations with a crisis area, the reaction of actors in such situations is 
rather based on what they believe is the actual issue and on what is the most effective 
and legitimate way to deal with it (see McNamara, 1999: 457). In other words, it is 
based on cognitive and normative ideas. More specifically, ideas lead to ‘policy 
prescriptions’, i.e. ‘precise causal ideas that facilitate policymaking by specifying how 
to solve particular policy problems’ (Tannenwald, 2005: 16; see Schmidt, 2008: 306). 
However, in intergovernmental contexts as the EU, cognitive and normative ideas do 
not necessarily have the same consequences among different actors. Although EU 
member states share common ‘fundamental norms’ (Puetter and Wiener, 2007), they do 
not foster directly coherent policy prescriptions in the EU. Member states may contest, 
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for example, what these ‘fundamental norms’ mean in practice (Puetter and Wiener, 
2007). Likewise, member states may simply be influenced by different – and maybe 
contradictory – ideas, as a recent study of the EU as a normative power has highlighted 
(Wagnsson, 2010). For example, some member states may favour in a certain crisis 
military intervention based on the defence of human right norms, while others may 
reject such actions based on the equally well established norm of non-intervention. 
After all, the EU as a whole does not have a fully-fledged common strategic culture, as 
the literature in this field concedes (Meyer, 2006). In brief, different, or different 
meanings of cognitive and normative ideas may lead to diverging policy prescriptions 
that are difficult to reconcile in ‘coordinative discourses’ (see Schmidt, 2008: 310-311) 
between national and European policy-makers at the EU level. Ultimately, this will lead 
to incoherent or no policy formulation at all. 
Yet, despite these potentially disrupting consequences of ideas, they also have certain 
characteristics that benefit common policy responses to international crises. Most 
notably, they are relatively ‘malleable’ (Béland and Cox, 2011: 10), especially in 
comparison with fixed interests, and leave usually different policy response options 
open, i.e. they constrain but do not determine options (see Campbell, 1998: 384-385). 
This facilitates greatly agreement in the aforementioned coordinative discourses 
between policy-makers, particularly in such highly institutionalised settings as the 
CFSP, where actors are ‘…structurally bound to co-operate in other policy areas’ 
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(Howorth, 2004: 229; see also Schmidt, 2008: 313). Therefore, the formulation of EU 
level policies in the international arena can be generally achieved if ideas foster broadly 
converging interpretations of a crisis among actors. Similar to the ‘congruence building’ 
between emerging global and existing local norms in the norm localization literature 
(Acharya, 2011), the crucial issue is not the complete acceptance or rejection of a 
specific idea in a crisis but building congruence between the emerging common 
interpretation of a crisis and the interpretations in different EU member states. 
Furthermore, it is possible that among deeply integrated states simply similar cognitive 
and normative ideas dominate, bringing about converging interpretations of specific 
events and, ultimately, converging policy prescriptions. 
In order to analyse concrete cases of convergence or divergence of crisis interpretations 
at the EU level it is necessary to focus on the relevant cognitive and normative ideas in 
international crises. In short, which ideas matter? First, cognitive and normative ideas 
that influence the perception of the issue at stake are crucial. In the words of Béland, 
‘ideas participate in the construction of the issues and problems that enter the policy 
agenda’ (Béland, 2009: 704). Secondly, as Mehta (2011: 33) has pointed out, the 
definition of an issue or problem does not determine the actual policy choices to deal 
with that issue or problem. Thus, once an issue is defined in a specific way, certain 
cognitive and normative ideas also inform how it should be dealt with. They help to 
answer questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of certain policy responses. 
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More specifically, ideas constrain the available options that are considered to be 
effective or legitimate (Campbell, 1998: 385; see also Kowert and Legro, 1996: 463-
465). Thirdly, apart from the ideas that fulfil these basic functions in an international 
crises, other ideas may also be relevant, in particular those that interpret intervening 
factors. Depending on the crises there can be one or several such factors, e.g. the 
relation with other crisis responders, historical relations with the countries involved in 
the crisis or economic considerations. In view of the case studies (see below), this 
article examines exemplarily one issue: the relation with the United States. 
As Figure 1 below shows, each function of cognitive and normative ideas can be 
imagined as an axis along which different interpretations exist: The x-axis shows how 
an issue can be perceived in a given international crisis; the y-axis represents the 
election of different instruments or means and the z-axis displays the distinct relations 
with the United States. Furthermore, each axis has two ends of opposing extreme 
interpretations, each of which constitutes a Weberian ideal-type: The x-axis lies 
between two ideal-types of issue perception: An issue can be perceived, on the one 
hand, as an absolute key priority and, on the other hand, as a mere non-issue. In 
practice, most of the time the actual issue perception lies somewhere between the two 
extremes. The ends of the y-axis show the ideal-types of the two most radical forms of 
measures that can be taken in foreign affairs: military force and persuasion. Depending 
on what is believed to be effective and/or legitimate, different types of policy 
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prescriptions are thinkable between these two sets of measures, e.g. peacekeeping, 
sanctions or conditionality. The z-axis, finally, displays the type of transatlantic 
relations different or different meanings of ideas may foster: At one end, there are the 
staunchly Atlanticist relations based on bandwagoning whereas at the other end, radical 
Europeanism prefers counterbalancing America’s power in the world. Once more, many 
intermediate forms of preferred transatlantic relationships are possible along this axis. 
 
 
 
-- Figure 1 presented on separate sheet at the end of the article -- 
 
 
 
It is assumed that within EU member states cognitive and normative ideas can foster 
almost any interpretation along the three axes. The more these interpretations move 
towards one of the six extremes the unlikelier it is that consensus can be reached. On the 
contrary, if the interpretations converge towards the centre, the more compromise is 
likely. Depending on the issue at stake the consensus can obviously move to a certain 
extent towards one or another extreme, but may not go beyond certain limits. If the 
three axes are put into a three-dimensional chart – highlighting, thus, the ultimately 
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interlinked character of the axes – these limits can be imagined as a flexible sphere that 
connects the border points between likely and unlikely consensus on the three axes (see 
grey sphere in Figure 1). It is in this ideational space that common foreign policy can be 
actually established. However, if the interpretations in one or more member states 
approach too much one of the extremes or opposing extremes simultaneously, they will 
move beyond this space of likely consensus. Thus, the result will be dissonance among 
member states and the failure of the EU to respond forcefully to an international crisis. 
 
Case study selection 
The conceptual framework requires at least two comparable case studies to demonstrate 
how it works in practice: on the one hand, one case of forceful EU policy output where 
converging interpretations along the three axes of Figure 1 fall within the common 
ideational space and, on the other hand, another case study of weak output where 
diverging interpretations remain outside this space. The 2003 Iraq war and its prelude 
and the early Iranian nuclear crisis (2002-2006) are useful case studies in this regard.2 In 
terms of the strength of the EU policy output, they are almost two ideal cases: Whereas 
the EU’s lack of a common response to the Iraq war is generally seen as one of the 
major failures of the CFSP, the common European response to the Iranian nuclear crisis 
is widely seen as one of the strongest in the last decade, in particular before 2006, when 
China, Russia and the United States joined the EU in its negotiations with Iran. 
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Although other, less clear-cut cases might be useful for follow-up research, the 
unambiguous difference between the Iran and Iraq case allows examining the utility of 
the model of the conceptual framework in its clearest form. Moreover, important 
similarities make the two cases comparable from an analytical point of view. Most 
notably, the type of international crisis was virtually the same. Both crises were major 
non-proliferation crises involving alleged WMD programmes, they occurred roughly 
around the same time in the same region and they were characterised by substantial 
transatlantic disagreement about how to deal with them. While the use of force by the 
United States in the case of Iraq certainly constitutes an important difference between 
the two cases, this did not preclude European consensus in Iraq or predispose agreement 
in the case of Iran. 
Apart from the comparability of the Iraq and Iran cases, the two cases also appear to be 
particularly worthwhile case studies for an idea based approach: First, both the regime 
in Tehran and the pre-invasion regime in Baghdad are or were very closed non-
democratic political systems where it was extremely difficult to obtain reliable 
information, in particular intelligence information about their alleged WMD 
programmes. This led to circumstances of high uncertainty for policy-makers, i.e. 
situations that are particular conducive to the role of ideas. Secondly, obvious material 
interests by certain member states, which may override an idea based approach, have 
been largely absent, most notably, in the commercial field. Although some member 
14 
 
states had important commercial relationships with Iraq and Iran, the existing literature 
agrees that they were not decisive in the two crises (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 77-78; 
Smeland, 2004: 44). 
By tracing the relevant processes and employing counterfactuals where useful, this 
article attempts to show how it were ultimately cognitive and normative ideas regarding 
the three different, though ultimately interwoven, areas of issue perception, use of 
means and transatlantic relations that have fostered diverging and converging 
interpretations in the respective case of Iraq and Iran. In each case, specific indicators 
are used to identify the different interpretations in declarations, statements, conclusions, 
speeches, interviews and relevant secondary literature – both at the level of national 
leaders in Britain, France and Germany and of the EU itself. Along the axis of issue 
perception the indicators distinguish between interpretations that emphasise either (a) 
the direct and immediate threat, (b) the indirect and long-term risk or concern or (c) the 
lack of threat, risk or concern emanating from an issue. Regarding the use of means, the 
analysis focuses on the interpretations of either the use of force, sanctions, negotiations 
or persuasion as the most effective and/or legitimate ways to deal with an issue. Finally, 
the analysis of the interpretations along the axis of transatlantic relations examines to 
what extent they emphasise, on the one hand, Europe’s dependence on the United States 
and the value of the transatlantic relationship and, on the other hand, the autonomy of 
15 
 
Europe vis-a-vis the United States and the value of an independent European and/or 
national way. 
 
Convergence and divergence in the EU Iraq and Iran policies 
Iraq 
Iraq had been on the radar of policy-makers in EU countries well before the 2002/2003 
Iraq crisis broke out. However, in the wake of the crisis, Iraq became clearly a key issue 
in the eyes of several EU member states. The best documented case in this regard is 
arguably the United Kingdom.3 Although Britain’s participation in the invasion is a 
hotly debated controversy, there appears to be widespread agreement on how the crucial 
decision-makers – largely Tony Blair, then the British Prime Minister, and his inner 
circle – perceived pre-invasion Iraq as a key issue for British foreign and security policy 
(Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers, 2007: 209-215; Bluth, 2004: 884): ‘My judgement as 
prime minister is that this threat is real, growing and of an entirely different nature to 
any conventional threat to our security that Britain has faced before’ (Blair, 2003). This 
perception has its roots not only in cognitive ideas, i.e. in what was believed to be an 
advanced Iraqi WMD programme, but also in Saddam Hussein’s violation of normative 
ideas, in particular in the form of widespread human rights violations and his alleged 
links with international terrorism. Although Blair and his inner circle might have 
exaggerated the actual threat stemming from the regime in Baghdad and misused 
16 
 
intelligence information, there exists little doubt that the Prime Minister himself 
believed (rightly or wrongly) that Saddam Hussein posed a very serious threat that had 
to be removed urgently (Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers, 2007: 212; Hoggett, 2005: 422). As 
the so-called ‘Letter of Eight’ (Aznar et al., 2003) and similar statements show, several 
leaders of EU member states shared publicly this perception of the Iraq issue. 
To a certain extent, this perception is also reflected in EU documents, thus showing in 
how far EU member states were actually able to find consensus (see Presidency of the 
European Union, 2003). But at heart, some member states did not share Britain’s and 
other’s perception of Iraq being a key threat that requires immediate action to overthrow 
its regime, as the evidence that linked the regime in Iraq with an existing WMD 
programme did not completely convince them (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 83; 
Finnemore, 2005: 202). This perception has been already well documented in several 
studies on France and Germany during the Iraq crisis (Coicaud, 2006; Davidson, 2011: 
150; Forsberg, 2005: 223; Müller, 2003: 6-7; Pond, 2005: 36). Joschka Fischer, then the 
German Foreign Minister, spoke, for example, only about suspicions concerning the 
Iraqi WMD programme: ‘Quite a few states suspect that Saddam Hussein’s regime is 
withholding relevant information and concealing military capabilities. This strong 
suspicion has to be dispelled beyond any doubt’ (Fischer, 2003). Thus, the opponents of 
the invasion rather believed that in spite of Saddam Hussein’s delaying tactics there was 
still sufficient time for further United Nations (UN) backed inspections to determine if 
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Iraq was pursuing a clandestine WMD programme or not, as stipulated by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1441 of November 2002. Especially in the case of the French 
leadership this was ultimately decisive in its opposition to another UN Security Council 
Resolution authorizing explicitly the use of force in early 2003 (Gordon and Shapiro, 
2004: 146-153). In brief, distinct cognitive ideas about ‘what is’ – immediate threat or 
long-term risk – and normative ideas about ‘what should be’ – regime change or change 
of regime behaviour –fostered diverging perceptions of the Iraq issue along the issue 
perception continuum, thus making a common European extremely difficult. 
Closely related to the diverging perception of the Iraq issue was the question how it 
should be dealt with. Since the United States was increasingly determined to intervene 
militarily in Iraq, the key question was the potential participation in military actions led 
by the United States. In essence, the EU had the option to support, tolerate or oppose the 
war collectively. An important dimension in this regard was certainly the transatlantic 
relationship, as will be shown further on. However, it would be too simplistic to explain 
crucial decisions about war and peace merely in terms of transatlantic relations. As the 
research on a European strategic culture has made clear (Meyer, 2006), specific beliefs 
about the use of force play also a major role. That is, apart from the transatlantic 
relationship, it were also specific ideas about instrumentality that led to the acceptance 
or rejection of concrete means in Iraq. The case of Britain shows how at least some of 
the supporters of the Iraq war were influenced by their own ideas about the legitimacy 
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and effectiveness of military means (Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers, 2007: 207; see Bluth, 
2004: 875). In Blair’s public statements it becomes clear that he believed that a military 
invasion was both more legitimate and effective than the available alternatives: ‘The 
judgment is this: would it have been better or more practical to have contained him 
through continuing sanctions and weapons inspections, or was this inevitably going to 
be, at some point, a policy that failed…?’ (Blair, 2004; see also Gordon and Shapiro, 
2004: 175). Blair and his supporters had particularly the failures of the international Iraq 
policies in the 1990s to contain and disarm Iraq effectively in their mind. According to 
Bluth (2004: 871), ‘The case of war rested on the premise that the containment of Iraq 
through sanctions was becoming ineffective and was morally unacceptable because of 
its effects on the Iraqi population…’. 
At the same time, the opponents of the use of force believed that containment, sanctions 
and inspections had been working in Iraq. Therefore, they advocated their continuing 
use, especially regarding the alleged Iraqi WMD programme: ‘Precisely because of the 
effectiveness of the work of the inspectors, we must continue to seek a peaceful solution 
to the crisis’ (Fischer, 2003; see also Pond, 2005: 34). Germany did also see the use of 
force as an inappropriate means in the Iraq case (Forsberg, 2005; Müller, 2003: 18). 
This does not mean that war was excluded on principle by all. Especially France kept its 
options open, at least until January 2003. However, they finally concluded that further 
inspections could still work and that a military invasion was (still) not justified (Gordon 
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and Shapiro, 2004: 116). Thus, ultimately distinct normative ideas about which means 
are legitimate and cognitive ideas about which are more effective in the case of Iraq at 
that specific point of time helped to facilitate support for diverging means among EU 
member states – use of force in one case and further inspections in the other. 
Still, this did not mean that consensus would have been entirely impossible in Iraq. Just 
one month before the invasion, the French government offered the US administration a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ that would have avoided at least an open quarrel between the 
two countries in the United Nations (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 148), reflecting a more 
general European tendency to avoid direct conflicts with the United States (see Fehl, 
2008: 264). However, if this is not possible and some or all member states disagree with 
the United States in terms of issue perception and use of means – showing once more 
how the different axes of Figure 1 are interrelated – these member states have to decide 
whether they should follow US leadership despite these disagreements or not. In the 
case of Iraq, a large number of member states was in such a situation: ‘Americans 
perceived a much more serious threat from Iraq than did France or Germany; (...) 
Americans, and the Bush Administration in particular, were much less confident in the 
ability of non-forceful tools, such as UN inspectors, to protect them from threats’ 
(Finnemore, 2005: 189). The key issue was that those member states that disagreed with 
the United States decided to defy openly the US leadership (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 
175). In other words, Iraq was not divisive because transatlantic relations as such came 
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up as an issue, but because member states followed opposing policy prescriptions 
regarding transatlantic relations, in particular the ‘big three’: Germany and France 
ultimately opposed openly the United States, whereas Britain fully supported the US-led 
invasion. 
These different policy prescriptions stemmed from different beliefs about the 
transatlantic relationship. In the words of Menon (2004: 638), ‘At the heart of these 
[intra-European] disputes were opposing conceptions of the appropriate relationship for 
Europe to maintain with the United States’. More precisely, EU member states had 
distinct cognitive ideas about ‘what is’ the transatlantic relationship and differing 
normative ideas about what that relationship ‘ought to be’. Whereas some saw the 
transatlantic relationship within the context of a multipolar world, where the United 
States should be opposed if necessary, for others the United States was the indispensible 
superpower that should not be opposed in matters that it considers to be crucial for its 
security (see Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 79-80; Menon, 2004: 638-640). British leaders, 
in particular Blair, believed that only a strategic partnership with the remaining 
superpower in the world could make the international system more secure (Menon, 
2004: 638). They interpreted, thus, the transatlantic relationship in a traditionally 
Atlanticist way that stressed Europe’s dependence on the United States and emphasised 
the overarching value of the transatlantic relationship. As Blair told the Financial Times 
in April 2003, ‘I don’t want Europe setting itself up in opposition to America (...) I 
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think it will be dangerous and destabilising’ (Newman and Stephens, 2003). According 
to Gordon and Shapiro (2004: 131), Blair even told regularly that ‘…he would prefer a 
divided Europe that was partly pro-American to a united Europe lined up against the 
United States’. Likewise, a more recent study highlights the importance of the value of 
the transatlantic alliance for the British government during the Iraq crisis (Davidson, 
2011: 134). 
For the French and German governments, on the other hand, the transatlantic 
relationship did not have the same importance. French leaders in particular saw the 
relationship rather as part of a broader multipolar system. In fact, a key element in the 
Iraq speeches of Jacques Chirac, then the French President, was Europe’s common 
voice in a multipolar world (Bratberg, 2011). Thus, French leaders, and in particular 
Chirac, interpreted the transatlantic relationship in a dominantly Europeanist way, 
where Europe’s own role took precedence over other considerations. At the eve of the 
invasion of Iraq, for instance, Chirac was quoted as saying ‘Any community with only 
one dominant power is always a dangerous one (...) That’s why I favor a multipolar 
world, in which Europe obviously has its place’ (Graff, 2003). These Europeanist 
interpretations were paralleled in Germany by a marked foreign policy change towards a 
more independent stance in relation with the United States (Forsberg, 2005: 224). As 
the German Foreign Minister at that time pointedly said, ‘alliance partners are not 
satellites’ (Fischer, 2002). Consequently, even for Germany, ‘The question at stake was 
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the nature of the world order and the USA’s relation to its allies, no longer the single 
issue of Iraq’ (Forsberg, 2005: 226; see Maull, 2008). In sum, Britain, France and 
Germany pushed their interpretations of the transatlantic relationship into opposing 
directions: Atlanticism, on the one hand, and Europeanism, on the other. Together with 
the diverging issue perceptions and beliefs about effective and legitimate means, this led 
to diverging interpretations that remained outside the common sphere of Figure 1, thus 
making common policy output impossible. 
 
Iran 
In the case of the early Iranian crisis (2002-2006), member states’ perceptions of the 
issue at stake were very similar: First of all, they believed since the very beginning that 
a substantial nuclear programme with military implications existed in Iran (Everts, 
2004: 675; Youngs, 2006: 77). Furthermore, member states also shared the relatively 
moderate intelligence assessment that it was a serious long-term concern and not a 
clear-cut threat (Müller, 2003: 7). Even the assessment of the British government was 
explicitly moderate. According to a written answer in the British parliament, ‘The 
technology which Iran has been seeking to develop at its nuclear facilities would enable 
them to produce fissile material, which can be used in the production of nuclear 
weapons’ (MacShane, 2003). In short, member states shared similar ideas about ‘what 
is’ in Iran. At the same time, European leaders avoided advocating openly regime 
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change in Iran, preferring engagement with the existing Iranian leadership to solve the 
nuclear crisis (Davidson and Powers, 2005; Müller, 2003). Thus, they also shared 
similar ideas about ‘what should be’. 
Up to the present day, no contrary standpoints have been voiced by European 
government officials or diplomats, neither in public nor in personal interviews for this 
article. Consequently, it was possible to adopt numerous informal (Douste-Blazy et al., 
2005) and formal documents, in particular 19 Council conclusions in the period under 
consideration in this article (2002-2006), where member states defined at the EU level 
what their common perception of the Iranian nuclear issue was. Most of the time the 
Council conclusions reflected the assessment in the first conclusions on the Iranian 
nuclear programme where the Union merely stated that ‘[t]he nature of some aspects of 
Iran’s programme raises serious concerns…’ (General Affairs and External Relations 
Council, 2003: 24). Until 2007 the EU even avoided to use in their official documents 
on Iran the terms ‘threat’ or ‘WMD’. The Iran problem was rather presented as a matter 
of confidence regarding almost purely technical issues such as uranium enrichment that 
came up after 2002.4 Security was basically perceived in terms of regional stability, 
with a special focus on the danger of a potential domino effect of nuclear proliferation, 
and in terms of the stability of the global non-proliferation order: ‘More nuclear 
weapons in this volatile region is the last thing we want. At this point the whole of the 
NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] regime would be more or less in tatters’ (Solana, 2005: 
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5). In sum, shared cognitive and normative ideas on Iran fostered issue perceptions of 
the Iranian nuclear programme that converged towards a moderate centre, thus making 
consensus at the European level possible. 
Parallel to these converging issue perceptions, policy-makers’ beliefs about the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of certain means also converged substantially in the case of 
Iran. First of all, EU member states agreed – at least in the period between 2002 and 
2006 – that military force was not a useful tool to deal with the Iranian nuclear crisis. As 
Davidson and Powers (2005: 415-416) argue, the actual driving force behind the 
cooperation of France and Britain in the Iran crisis was their desire to avoid another 
preventive war as in Iraq. Germany was equally opposed to the use of military means. 
Gerhard Schröder, then the Chancellor of the Federal Republic, countered alleged US 
war plans against Iran with the words, ‘…let’s take the military option off the table. We 
have seen it doesn’t work’ (New York Times, 2005). This does not mean that the 
European consensus on the rejection of military means was a given. In more recent 
years, French sable-rattling (Yost, 2006) and British war plans (Hopkins, 2011) indicate 
that the use of military force is not excluded categorically by all EU member states (see 
Hanau Santini, 2010: 469, 482). In fact, elite surveys (Martinez, 2006: 15) and 
individual analyses by experts (personal interview, Jan 2009; Everts, 2004) suggest new 
divisions in Europe if the United States or Israel attack nuclear installations in Iran or 
intensify the current acts of sabotage and targeted killings in Iran. 
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However, European governments did not push towards the use of force on the use-of-
means axis in Figure 1. In line with the moderate issue perception outlined above, 
negotiations were believed to be the most legitimate and effective way to deal with Iran, 
above all between 2002 and 2006. For example, Jack Straw, then the British Foreign 
Secretary, argued that ‘[a] negotiated solution, in which both sides have a feeling of 
ownership, is in the best interests of Iran and of the international community’ (Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2005: 4). This reflected also the more 
general belief in the concept of effective multilateralism as an effective tool to deal with 
international issues (see Sauer, 2008: 285). The initial successes of the European 
negotiation approach in the form of the 2003 Teheran Agreement and the 2004 Paris 
Agreement with Iran underpinned the belief in the effectiveness of the negotiation based 
approach (Seaboyer and Thränert, 2007: 102). Not surprisingly, still after years of 
arduous negotiations, mainly by Javier Solana, the High Representative and chief 
negotiator, ‘The EU believes that the [Iran] issue can still be solved by negotiations’ 
(General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2006: 13). 
Even after 2005, when it became clear in the eyes of EU member states that Iran was 
reluctant to cooperate with the EU on the nuclear issue, European consensus on the 
adequate means to deal with the Iran issue did not break down. Specifically after the 
victory by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the Iranian presidential elections in summer 2005 
and the following suspension of key provisions of the 2004 Paris Agreement by the 
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regime in Tehran, EU governments agreed that the best way to deal with the Iranian 
issue was its referral from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the UN 
Security Council (Resolution 1696) and subsequent sanctions against Iran (Resolution 
1737), as the nine Council conclusions between Ahmadinejad’s election victory and UN 
Security Council Resolution 1737 show. Although there existed disagreement about the 
intensity of the sanctions (Sauer, 2008: 278-281, 286-288), ultimately the sanction 
approach prevailed. As the European Elites Survey after the first round of sanctions 
highlighted, this preference for a sanctions approach clearly reflected the widespread 
belief of European policy-makers in sanctions as the most effective way to deal with 
Iran (Dau, 2007: 16). In the words of Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German foreign 
minister after November 2005, ‘Excluding economic sanctions would be imprudent’ 
(Aust et al., 2006). Consequently, the EU could shift its policy means from a pure 
negotiation based approach to one that used both negotiations and sanctions when it 
believed that the new approach was both more legitimate and effective. 
Apart from the concrete means to be used in the Iranian nuclear crisis, the EU was also 
able to find a common action format that was believed to be legitimate and effective in 
the eyes of virtually all member states, including smaller ones (personal interviews, Dec 
2008-Jan 2009), even though the initial E3 directoire consisting of France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom was highly controversial and never got an explicit 
endorsement by the Council. Through the inclusion of the High Representative the new 
27 
 
EU/E3 format got the necessary link with the rest of the EU member states to establish a 
common European Iran policy (see personal interviews, Dec 2008-Jan 2009; Dryburgh, 
2008).5 In sum, similar ideas about what are effective and legitimate ways to deal with 
the Iranian nuclear crisis fostered converging policy prescriptions that culminated in the 
so-called double track approach based on negotiations and sanctions. 
The main problem with the emerging EU consensus on the Iranian nuclear crisis and the 
most adequate means was that the United States did not agree initially with the 
European approach. Steven Everts (2004: 676), later a senior advisor to Solana, even 
spoke of ‘diametrically opposed policies’ by the EU and the United States. Other senior 
experts called repeatedly for stronger US-EU rapprochement concerning Iran, showing 
in how far the two sides actually diverged (Einhorn, 2004; Smeland, 2004: 57-64). 
Although the US administration suffered from some internal divisions regarding Iran 
between 2002 and 2005 (Kubbig, 2008), in general the US approach towards Iran was 
substantially more outspoken than the EU approach: It advocated regime change, strict 
sanctions and the further international isolation of Iran (Rudolf, 2007). The crucial point 
for this article is that no European government supported these more radical US 
positions. On the contrary, the EU as a whole opposed the more extreme policy options 
by the United States (Kile, 2005: 13). Even Blair argued that the British Iran strategy 
was ‘…different from the US administration…it is one of constructive and conditional 
engagement with the government of Iran’ (quoted in Davidson and Powers, 2005: 421). 
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More specifically, before 2005 the EU/E3 resisted several times US pressure to refer the 
Iranian nuclear file from the IAEA to the UN Security Council (Denza, 2005: 306), 
which would have implied potential sanctions, in particular in October 2003 (Marquis, 
2003), i.e. shortly before the Tehran Agreement, and in September 2005 (Linzer, 2004), 
when it became clear that Iran had the intention to defy key provisions of the 2004 Paris 
Agreement. Especially in autumn 2003, it was feared that the transatlantic disagreement 
over Iran could even trigger another major transatlantic crisis (Black and Traynor, 
2003). Furthermore, the US administration criticised and discouraged the EU/E3 
negotiations with Iran from 2003 on (Warrick, 2003). Apparently, George W. Bush 
even asked Blair personally not to sign the 2003 Tehran Agreement (Youngs, 2006: 79). 
Although internal divisions within the US administration prevented a more forceful 
opposition to the EU approach, the United States essentially undermined the EU 
negotiations with Iran by continuing its strict sanctioning policy and refusing key 
concessions the Iranian negotiators were seeking, in particular security guarantees and 
support for Iran’s entry in the World Trade Organization (Bergenäs, 2010: 503; 
Harnisch, 2007). 
However, until 2005 EU governments remained firm and resisted US pressure to change 
its approach towards Iran. On the one hand, this resistance can be explained with the 
belief in the European policy prescription as being the most effective and legitimate 
options to deal with the Iran issue (see above), reflecting, once more, in how far the 
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different axes in Figure 1 are actually interrelated. But on the other hand, European 
governments also chose consciously a European approach distinct of the one of the 
United States in order to show the Americans how the European way works in practice 
(see Sauer, 2008: 285). Everts (2004: 675) pointed out, for example, that ‘Iran offers 
Europeans a chance to give substance to the idea that there is a European approach to 
managing security issues [emphasis added]’. Likewise, Thérèse Delpech (2005: 291), a 
senior French official, argued that ‘…success or failure of current negotiations will be 
seen in the wider context of the “European way”’. In this way, the interpretations on the 
transatlantic axis in Figure 1 moved slightly towards a more Europeanist position that 
helped challenge consciously American policy preferences. However, none of the 
European interpretations was pushed towards the extreme of a clearly articulated 
Europeanist position that would have led to policies defying openly the United States, 
e.g. by adopting a stronger pro-Iran stance concerning sensitive nuclear technology. 
On the contrary, in 2005 European policies shifted clearly towards the US policy 
positions (Seaboyer and Thränert, 2007: 114), in particular regarding the potential 
referral of Iran to the UN Security Council (Kile, 2005: 19; Youngs, 2006: 82) and, for 
the first time, regarding the outright rejection of limited uranium enrichment activities 
in Iran (Sauer, 2008: 288). With this shift the Europeans reacted to all appearances to 
major shifts in the US Iran policy. Most notably, in the wake of Condoleeza Rice taking 
over the State Department in early 2005, the United States dropped several objections 
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that complicated the European negotiations with Iran, e.g. to Iranian membership in the 
World Trade Organization. On a more abstract level, however, the shift towards a more 
pro-American stance could not have been possible without the belief among basically 
all European actors that US involvement in the Iranian nuclear crisis was highly 
desirable to increase the effectiveness of the ongoing negotiations. Not surprisingly, the 
EU/E3 welcomed clearly the more active involvement of the United States in the 
Iranian nuclear crisis after 2005 (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2005: 
7). Likewise, Solana and the E3 foreign ministers at the time argued with a specific 
reference to the United States that ‘We will continue to work for a united international 
approach which is necessary to maximise the chances of success’ (Barnier et al., 2005: 
5). In short, after the 2005 policy shifts in the US Iran policy, European interpretations 
converged towards a slightly more Atlanticist position, showing in how far 
interpretations on the axes of Figure 1 can actually move slightly from one direction 
into another. In combination with the congruent issue perceptions and the converging 
beliefs about the most effective and legitimate means, this moderate flexibility made 
forceful policy output by the EU possible. 
 
Conclusions 
Iraq and Iran are two clearly opposed cases of the European Union acting in 
international crises. They show how the European Union can become either a fairly 
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coherent (though not necessarily successful) actor in its own right – as during the 
Iranian nuclear crisis – or a deeply divided international organization – as during the 
2002/2003 Iraq crisis. Such radically different foreign policy output poses a serious 
challenge to existing concepts of European foreign policy, as has been highlighted 
already by a recent review article on CFSP (Krotz and Maher, 2011: 549). The key 
argument of this article is that in many international crises, such as Iraq or Iran, crisis 
responses depend on cognitive and normative ideas that guide actions under conditions 
of high uncertainty. Conceptually, the question is not whether (Parsons, 2002) or whose 
(Acharya, 2011) ideas matter but – in line with the most recent idea based research – 
how ideas matter (Mehta, 2011: 25). More specifically, cognitive and normative ideas 
foster certain interpretations of a crisis along several interrelated core themes, in 
particular, issue perception, instrumentality and, depending on the crisis, transatlantic 
relations or other themes. Thus, despite the intergovernmental set-up of the CFSP, the 
EU does not have to reconcile or coordinate in many international crises opposing 
national interests based on clear-cut material constraints, but merely the different 
interpretations of its member states along these themes. As long as these interpretations 
converge, measured, though still forceful crisis responses will be likely. Yet, if they 
diverge, dissonance will be the probable outcome. The empirical analysis has shown 
how – at the European level – the interpretations of the Iraq case diverged in the three 
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areas of issue perception, instrumentality and transatlantic relations, whereas in the case 
of Iran these interpretations converged towards a moderate centre. 
Comparing the results, finally, allows drawing up an indicative picture of the ideational 
space of Figure 1 within which the EU can find foreign policy consensus during 
international crises: First, the interpretation of an issue in a given situation may not tend 
towards the extreme form of an immediate threat for one or several EU member states, 
unless the circumstances are very obvious. Otherwise, it is very unlikely that all 
member states follow such an issue perception. In general, it is much more likely that 
the perceptions of an issue are found between the extremes of key and non-issue such as 
in the case of Iran, where its nuclear programme has been interpreted as a ‘serious 
concern’. Secondly, as both the Iraq and Iran case have shown, the EU is able to agree 
on coercive measures as both effective and legitimate means. Military force, however, is 
much more problematic, especially if it takes the form of a full-scale invasion of another 
country. At the same time, pure persuasion in the form of dialogue, the other extreme 
option to act in an international crisis, is only a possibility if the EU does not have to 
deal with a concrete security problem. As the European reactions to the Iranian crisis 
have shown, it is very unlikely that all EU member states believe that persuasive means 
are the most effective and legitimate way to deal with a crisis that is considered to be 
serious. In practice, common EU actions typically oscillate between negotiations and 
sanctions. Thirdly, whenever the EU has to find consensus concerning US leadership in 
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an international crisis, not only over-emphasizing the importance of the transatlantic 
relationship but also straightforward balancing appear to be outside the limits of a 
collective European foreign policy, as the Iraq case suggests. Usually, the EU’s 
relations with the United States entail both elements that emphasise the need of the 
transatlantic relationship and Europe’s autonomy vis-a-vis the United States, as in the 
case of Iran between 2003 and 2006. In general, these limits of the ideational space of 
collective foreign policy output in international crises do not allow the EU to become a 
fully-fledged crisis actor any time soon, but they are certainly broader than sceptics of a 
common EU foreign policy may concede. In the long-term, the existence of an 
ideational space may even feed into the emergence of a broader European strategic 
culture. 
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Notes
 
.1. In general, ‘ideas’ are defined here as shared beliefs. On the ‘semi-circle’ between rationalism and 
reflectivism (Christiansen et al., 2001) the tendency is towards the rationalist side and ‘soft positivism’ 
(Tannenwald, 2005: 13-14). 
2. These two cases have also been used by other studies (e.g., Maull 2008). 
3. The public debate in the United Kingdom about the Iraq war has produced a huge amount of academic 
publications (see for example Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers, 2007; Bluth, 2004; Hoggett, 2005) and 
several official reports by select committees and inquiries, including the report by Lord Butler. 
4. A senior diplomat of a major EU member state even complained that the EU has not been able to 
transmit sufficiently the potential danger of the Iranian nuclear programme (personal interview, Jan 
2009). 
5. Only the Italians were not completely satisfied with the new format, but they were able to gain 
‘privileged information exchange’ (personal interview with E3 official, Jan 2009). 
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Figure 1. Ideational space of EU crisis interpretations along three key axes 
